We consider a setting where in a known future time, a certain continuous random variable will be realized. There is a public prediction that gradually converges to its realized value, and an expert that has access to a more accurate prediction. Our goal is to study when should the expert reveal his information, assuming that his reward is based on a logarithmic market scoring rule (i.e., his reward is proportional to the gain in loglikelihood of the realized value). Our contributions are: (1) we characterize the expert's optimal policy and show that it is threshold based.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a futures market. The traders in a futures market make contracts to buy and sell an asset that will be delivered, and paid for, at a known future date, the delivery date. Traders make money by buying for less than the market's spot price on the delivery date, which we shall henceforth call the true price or value, or by selling for more. In effect, a futures market is a prediction market for the true price.
Consider now an expert in a futures market. An expert is not a trader himself, but someone who is reputed to have access to a more accurate signal than possessed by regular traders. Often, his reputation and living is based on this. Stock market analysts, investment gurus and various types of journalists fit this description.
The expert contributes to a market by making a public prediction. We assume that the expert's level of expertise, which we measure by quality and describe below, is known to the market. Then, such a prediction is a significant market event. Clearly it is optimal for a market to heed an expert whose prediction already encompasses all current common knowledge and adds to it, but this, in itself, does not say of how much value any particular expert announcement was to the market, nor indeed, whether it was positive. It is only at delivery date that the value of an expert's prediction may be evaluated. Market scoring rules, discussed below, show how this may be done in a strategy-proof manner. The expert's reward is proportional to this value. Whether this reward takes the form of actual compensation, or less tangibly in a boost to his reputation as an expert, is immaterial to our discussion.
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http://dx.doi.org/10. 1145/2940716.2940729 While we present our work in the context of a market, the market is not strictly necessary. This work is relevant for any situation where a public is interested in the value of a future continuous variable and has a time-varying consensus estimate of it. Examples abound: The weather or climate, results of sport competitions, election results or new book / movie / album sales.
The Market as a Random Walk
The current price in a futures market represents a current consensus on the true price (assume that interest rates, or inflation rates, have been incorporated into the price). According to the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), the current price represents all currently available information, and therefore it is impossible to consistently "beat the market". Consistent with the EMH is the random-walk hypothesis, according to which stock market prices (and their derivatives) evolve according to a random walk and thus cannot be predicted. By the random-walk hypothesis, the true price is the result of a random walk from the current market price. Equivalently, and the point of view we take in this paper, the current price is the result of a random walk, reversed in time, from the true price.
A random walk adds periodical (say, daily) i.i.d. steps to the market price. Assuming prices have been adjusted for known trends, the steps have zero mean. By suitable scaling of the price, the step variance can be normalized to 1. Following a common assumption that the random walk is Gaussian, the steps have standard normal distribution (i.e., N (0, 1)).
Expert Quality
An expert's expertise consists of having a more accurate signal of the predicted price x 0 than the market's, and the expert's quality measures by how much. The quality q ∈ [0, 1] measures what part of the market's uncertainty the expert "knows", so that it does not figure in the expert's own uncertainty. Equivalently, the expert's uncertainty is 1−q of the market's uncertainty. This proportion is statistical: It is the uncertainties' variances, rather than their realizations, that are related by proportion. If the market price is a Gaussian random walk from the true price with N (0, 1) steps, the expert's prediction is a Gaussian random walk from the true price with N (0, 1 − q) steps.
The expert's knowledge, i.e., the part of the market's uncertainty that the expert is not uncertain about, has steps of zero mean and q variance. On the assumption that the expert's knowledge steps and uncertainty steps are mutually independent, their sum has the sum mean and sum variance of their parts, i.e., they sum back to the market's uncertainty steps of zero mean and variance q + (1 − q) = 1.
An expert with q = 1 has no uncertainty at all, and his signal equals the true value x 0 at all times t. At the other extreme, a (so-called) expert with q = 0 has no knowledge beyond common knowledge, and his signal equals the market value x t at all t.
In this paper an expert's quality is common knowledge, shared by all traders as well as himself. Whether its value q represents objective reality, or is a belief, based, e.g., on past performance, makes no difference to our discussion.
Scoring a Prediction
A scoring rule is a way to evaluate and reward a prediction of a stochastic event. The predictor declares at time t > 0 a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(R), and at time 0 some r ∈ R is realized. A scoring rule S rewards the predictor S(p, r) when her prediction was p and the realized value is r. In market settings, and many other settings, there exists a current predictionp and then the predictor is evaluated on the scoring difference effected S(p, r)−S(p, r). Note that the optimization problem of the predictor in a market situation is the same, since he has no influence over S(p, r), the only difference is that now the predictor might be penalized for inaccurate predictions. A proper scoring rule is a scoring rule for which reporting the true distribution is optimal according to the predictor's information. 1 The logarithmic scoring rule, with S(p, r) = log p r , scores a prediction by the log-likelihood of the realized value according to the prediction. It is proper, and so is the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) which scores S(p, r) − S(p, r) = log(p r /p r ) when the current prediction isp ∈ ∆(R). Conditional on p being the correct distribution, the expected reward is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between p andp: E r∼p [log p r /p r ] = D KL (p||p). While the reward may be positive or negative, its (conditional) expectation is always non-negative.
In our model expert predictions are scored with LMSR, which the expert maximizes. 2 say "LMSR has become the de facto market maker mechanism for prediction markets. It is used by many companies including Inkling Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo!, and Microsoft".
The Expert's Dilemma
Assume that the expert has no obligation to speak at any particular time, or at all. He may make a single prediction, at a time of his choosing. What time should the expert choose for his prediction?
The expert is aware at all times of the market current price, x t , and of his own prediction y t , where t is the number of periods remaining to delivery date. He does not know future market prices, or what signals he will have in the future, but he does know that both will converge on the true price, i.e., x 0 = y 0 . In other words, his value to the market due to his better signal is gradually eroding, as the market's uncertainty dwindles with the approaching delivery date.
Does that not simply mean that the expert should make a prediction at the earliest opportunity? Not necessarily. What if at time t the expert observes x t = y t , i.e., that his own prediction coincides with the market's? This may occur by chance even though his signal is, on average, less noisy than the market's. Announcing his prediction will not change the market price, and so its value is minimal. Waiting is the better option, since in all probability, in the next period (t−1), x t−1 = y t−1 , and if not then x t−2 = y t−2 etc.. The same may be true if x t and y t are not identical but merely close, with what the informal "close" means needing a formal analysis.
Summary of Results
Our results shed an interesting light on the expert's dilemma. Indeed in most cases it is in the expert's advantage to wait for the right time, when his prediction and the market's prediction are significantly different. We show that the optimal policy is a time-dependent threshold on the discrepancy between the expert and market signals, i.e., on |x t − y t |. We also show a near-optimal policy in which the threshold is independent of the current time, depending only on the initial time and the expert's quality.
Another conceptual result is the way quality affects the strategy of an expert in revealing his information. High-quality experts will tend to wait more, while lowerquality experts will reveal information earlier. For any time t and discrepancy |x t − y t |, there is a threshold on the quality q * such that experts with quality below q * are advised to reveal their information, while experts with quality above it are advised to wait.
Technically, our analysis of the expert's dilemma shows that the expert strives to maximize a function of the difference between his signal and the market's, namely (x t − y t ) 2 /t. The situation he faces is neither a sub-martingale nor a super-martingale, so no easy recipe guides it. We show that his predict-now-or-later dilemma is optimally decided by a threshold on the value of |x t − y t |. This threshold is proportional to a universal function θ(t) of the time remaining t, and to √ q (i.e., good experts speak later).
His expected reward following this optimal policy is governed by another universal function Ψ(t) and by his quality q.
We provide upper and lower bounds for Ψ(T ), where T is the total number of time steps, and show that it asymptotically limits at 2 log log T . We provide an efficient dynamic-programming algorithm to compute the Ψ(t) and θ(t) functions, and also provide a calculation for up to t = 10 7 , that shows that our asymptotic bounds are fairly tight.
Related Work
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was introduced by [Fama et al. 1969 ]. The Random Walk Hypothesis is even older, originating in the 19th century, and discussed by, e.g., [Samuelson 1965 ] and [Fama 1965] , and surveyed in [Beechey and Vickery 2000]. The Black-Scholes option pricing model [Black and Scholes 1973] is based on a Gaussian random walk assumption.
Scoring rules have a very long history, going back to [De Finetti 1937] , [Brier 1950 ] and [Good 1952] , and are studied in much subsequent work ( [Sanders 1963] , [Winkler 1969] , [Savage 1971] , [Gneiting and Raftery 2007] ).
Market scoring rules, and the LMSR in particular, were introduced by [Hanson 2003 ] for the study of prediction markets. Much of the literature of prediction markets is concerned with the liquidity of the market, and the need of a market maker to facilitate such liquidity for traders. (See for a survey.) This line of research has unveiled an intriguing connection between the market maker policy and online learning algorithms [Chen and Vaughan 2010; Abernethy et al. 2011 ]. ] studied the strategy of experts who may predict in a single prediction period, and concluded that, under their model assumptions, experts strive to be the first to make a prediction. Our work uses scoring rules for their original motivation, rather than market maker and liquidity in prediction markets.
Random walks have been thoroughly investigated. We used the textbook [Révész 2005 ] as a general reference. It discusses Khintchine's Law of the Iterated Logarithm [Khintchine 1924 ] at length. However, our optimal policy bound proof is based on a different treatment by [Damron 2012 ].
Paper Organization
To keep this paper short, we omitted some proofs. The reader will find a full version, including all proofs, in [Ban et al. 2016 ]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 describes the problem an expert faces. In Section 4 we show that the expert's optimal policy is a threshold. Section 5 sets bounds on the optimal policy, and Section 6 shows how to calculate it. In section 7 we summarize and offer concluding remarks.
MODEL

Market prediction
A market predicts the outcome of a continuous random variable X 0 , whose realized value x 0 will be revealed at time 0. Time is discrete and flows backwards from an initial period T , i.e., T, . . . , t, . . . , 1, 0. At any time t > 0 the market observes x 0 + Z t where Z t ∼ N (0, t). We model Z t as a random walk with independent steps Z t , . . . , Z 1 , i.e., Z t = t τ =1 Z τ and Z τ ∼ N (0, 1). Let the market prediction (when uninformed by experts) be X t := x 0 + Z t at time t, and let x t be the realized value. With every passing period t, the value of Z t = z t is revealed and becomes common knowledge, and the market's new prediction changes to x t−1 = x t − z t . Note that the variance of Z t decreases with time, and at time 0 the market's prediction coincides with the true value
T . This assumption makes posterior computations dependent solely on observed signals, since 3 
Expert information and goal
There is an expert, with quality q ∈ [0, 1], whose quality is common knowledge. The expert's quality consists in "knowing" part of the random steps Z t of every period, and therefore getting a more accurate signal of X 0 . Formally,
The expert may make a single prediction of the outcome, at a time of his choosing. The expert's predicted distribution at t is N (y t , (1 − q)t). In practice, it is enough for the expert to announce y t as his entire distribution follows by the model and common knowledge. A prediction's reward is determined at time 0 based on the realized value (x 0 ) by LMSR. (For continuous distributions, the logarithmic scoring rule scores the log of the result probability density). Namely, if the market prediction prior to the expert prediction is X − t ∼ N (µ − , σ − ) with density f − , and following the expert prediction the posterior market prediction is
, where x 0 is the realized value. An expert who refrains from making a prediction has a benefit of 0. The expert optimization problem is to maximize his expected reward given his private information. The question before the expert is if and when to make a prediction.
Preliminaries
The complementary cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution is conventionally denoted by
The following concentration inequality will be very useful for bounding deviations of a random walk.
PROOF. Formula 7.1.13 from [Abramowitz and Stegun 1964] 
, the lemma follows.
THE EXPERT OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Consider the case that the expert makes a prediction at time t. Let the market prediction prior to the expert prediction be X − t ∼ N (µ − , σ 2 − ) with density f − and the posterior market prediction be X + t ∼ N (µ + , σ 2 + ) with density f + . Denote expert's reward by W .
As the reward depends on x 0 , its value is only known at time 0, but the expert can calculate his reward expectation at t, based on his belief that
As the second moment of the normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) is µ 2 + σ 2 , we get by taking expectations in (3)
Observe that the right-hand side is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the two distributions X + t and X − t , i.e.
PROPOSITION 3.1. An expert reward expectation when making a prediction is
PROOF. For this setting, we have µ − = x t , σ 2 − = t, µ + = y t , and σ 2 + = (1 − q)t. Substituting these in (4) we derive (5).
Note that the reward W may be positive or negative depending on x 0 , but its expectation is always non-negative.
Considering the expert's expected reward (5), we observe that the right-hand side has a term − 1 2 q + log(1 − q) which depends only on the expert's quality, and is strictly positive for 0 < q < 1. The other term is non-negative. Therefore, an expert with positive quality will always make a prediction, in the last period at the latest. The expert maximizes his expected reward by selecting a prediction time t that maximizes the other term (yt−xt) 2 2t . At any time t, the expert knows x t and y t , and can calculate his expected reward from an immediate prediction at time t. However, the expert does not know y τ and x τ for any τ < t. Should the expert make his prediction now, or wait for a higher-benefit opportunity?
is an affine transformation of the expert's reward (5), so the optimal policy to maximize it is essentially identical to the optimal expert prediction policy. From now on we consider maximizing S 2 t /t, which we call the Canonical Problem. For clarity, the following is an explicit statement of the problem.
PROBLEM 1 (CANONICAL PROBLEM). Let S t be a Gaussian random walk with N (0, 1) steps. Suppose an expert is successively presented with S T , S T −1 , . . . , S 1 . If the expert stops at t, his reward is S 2 t /t. How should the expert maximize his reward? We define the expected reward of an expert who follows the optimal strategy in the canonical problem, distinguishing between the expectation given the current value of S t = c, denoted by ψ t (c), and the expectation independent from the current value, denoted by Ψ(t) = Ec[ψt(c)].
Definition 3.2. Denote by ψ t (c) the expert's optimal-strategy expected reward at t, conditional on S t = c. The expert's optimal-strategy expected reward Ψ(t), is
THE OPTIMAL POLICY IS A THRESHOLD
In this section we derive properties of the optimal strategy of the expert. In Proposition 4.1 we give a recursive formula for the canonical problem's expected reward ψ t (c), and state some properties satisfied by the function. Later, in Proposition 4.2, we show that the expert's optimal policy is a threshold policy. Namely, if he stops for some value c he will also stop for any value c > c. We also show that there is always a finite threshold, namely, for any time t there is some value θ(t) such that for c > θ(t) the expert stops.
We conclude with Proposition 4.3 that relates the canonical problem back to the expert's strategy, showing that the expert strategy depends on (x t −y t ) 2 . An implication of this is the interesting insight that experts with higher quality will wait with their prediction and pursue higher rewards in situations where their lower-quality peers will not. PROPOSITION 4.1.
(1) The optimal expected reward ψ t (·) satisfies the recursion formula
where ψ W AIT t (c) is the expectation from waiting at least one period, and is equal to,
(2) The conditional optimal-strategy expected reward ψ t (c) is Lipschitz continuous, piecewise differentiable, positive, even and increasing in |c|.
PROOF. We first prove the first part of the Proposition. The expert's expectation is the maximum between the benefit for stopping (which is c 2 /t, since S t = c), and the benefit for waiting at least one period. If the expert chooses to wait, and the value of S t−1 is c − x, his benefit will be ψ t−1 (c − x). For every real x, the probability density for this is
and so the expectation for waiting is ψ t−1 (c − x) averaged over this conditional probability for each x,
This completes the proof of (7). (8) is derived from (10) by substituting x → t−1 t x + c t , while (9) is derived from it by substituting x → c − x.
We now prove the second part of the Proposition. We prove the claim by induction on t. For t = 1, the expert stops for every c so ψ 1 (c) = c 2 for which the claim holds. Assume the claim holds for t − 1. Then by (6) and (7) ψ t (c) is positive, even, Lipschitz continuous and piecewise differentiable. It remains to show that ψ t is increasing in |c|. In any range where ψ t (c) = c 2 /t it is increasing in |c|. Elsewhere, we differentiate (9) with respect to c,
where the second identity uses the substitution
As by the induction hypothesis ψ t−1 (c) is non-decreasing in |c|, the integrand is non-negative, and so is the integral. Hence, ψ t (c) ≥ 0.
Next we state and prove a proposition that says that the optimal policy is a threshold, and show that for every t the threshold is finite. PROPOSITION 4.2. Define θ(t) to be the smallest c ≥ 0 for which ψ t (c) = c 2 /t. For every t, θ(t) exists, and the optimal strategy in the canonical problem is to stop at the first t for which |S t | ≥ θ(t).
PROOF. We need to show that there is a c such that ψ t (c) = c 2 /t, and that it is optimal to stop for |S t | ≥ c. The latter claim we show by showing that if it is optimal to stop for |S t | = c then it is also optimal for |S t | > c. We prove both parts of this claim by induction on t, the first part by proving a stronger statement, that ψ t (c) − c 2 /t is non-increasing in |c|.
For t = 1, θ(1) = 0, i.e., the expert stops for any value of S 1 , and ψ 1 (c) − c 2 = 0 is constant and so non-increasing.
Our induction hypothesis is that θ(t − 1) exists, and that ψ t−1 (c) − c 2 /(t − 1) is nonincreasing in |c|. By Proposition 4.1 ψ t−1 is an even function, hence, its derivative is an odd function. For c ≥ 0 we have ψ t−1 (c) − (2c)/(t − 1) ≤ 0 and for c < 0,
where the last equality relies on the fact that ψ t−1 , the derivative of an even function,
≥ 0, we can apply (11) to derive (when ψ t (c) > c 2 /t)
In summary, whenever ψ t (c) > c 2 /t we have,
We conclude |ψ t (c)| ≤ 2|c| t for every c and so ψ t (c) − c 2 /t is non-increasing in |c|. Since ψ t (c) − c 2 /t ≥ 0, and, if θ(t) exists, ψ t (θ(t)) − θ 2 (t)/t = 0, we conclude ψ t (c) − c 2 /t = 0 for all |c| ≥ θ(t). I.e., the expert should stop whenever |S t | ≥ θ(t).
It remains to be shown that θ(t) exists. To show that, it is enough to show that for some c , stopping is at least as beneficial as waiting, i.e., that
By (12), for c ≥ 0
Substituting any c ≥ t ψ t (0) in the above satisfies (13), since we have ψ W AIT
The expert's optimal policy and expectation now follows PROPOSITION 4.3.
(1) At time t, a prediction made by an expert with quality q maximizes his expected reward if and only if (y t − x t ) 2 ≥ qθ 2 (t) (2) The expert's expected reward from following this policy for every t is
where x t is the market prediction and y t the expert's prediction at time t.
PROOF. As noted in Section 3, (Y t − X t )/ √ q is a Gaussian random walk with N (0, 1) steps. Using the solution of the Canonical Problem, the expert should predict when |(y t − x t )/ √ q| > θ(t). In other words, when (y t − x t ) 2 > qθ 2 (t). The expert's expected reward was given in (5), where it was noted that the timedependent term is (y t − x t ) 2 /(2t). In the Canonical Problem, he would be maximizing (y t − x t ) 2 /(qt) for an expected gain of ψ t (c) = ψ t yt−xt √ q . In his actual prediction problem, he would be maximizing (y t − x t ) 2 /(2t), i.e., q/2 times his Canonical Problem target.
We observe from Proposition 4.3 that given the same observations y t , x t , experts with different qualities may make different decisions regarding the timing of predictions -Experts with q < (yt−xt) 2 θ 2 (t) will make a prediction.
-Experts with q > (yt−xt) 2 θ 2 (t) will wait.
Thus a high-quality expert will remain silent in a situation where a low-quality expert will speak. However, since qualities are limited to 1, all experts, regardless of their quality, should make a prediction when |y t − x t | > θ(t)
BOUNDS ON THE OPTIMAL POLICY
In this section we derive upper and lower bounds on the expectation of the reward of the optimal policy. The proof is based on proofs of the Law of the Iterated Logarithm (LIL), but with several important differences.
The LIL ( [Hartman and Wintner 1941] ) states that in a random walk, where the increments are N (0, 1) , the maximum deviation is √ 2t log log t with probability 1. Namely, for any > 0, the deviation, with probability one, is greater than 2(1 − )t log log t at infinitely many times t, and only at finite number of times t greater than 2(1 + )t log log t.
In our proof, we consider finite error bounds, and are not satisfied with probability one results. For the optimal policy, in our setting, it is sufficient to have a single high value, and there is no need to have the event occur infinitely often. This implies that we need to consider a more refined bound.
Another difference is that we consider the deviations for all t ≤ T for a given T . When we consider the expert utility, its expected value is with respect to the global time horizon T , and not with respect to the current time. Technically, this results in a different threshold from the LIL: We set the threshold to be Φ(t) := √ 2t log log T , while the LIL sets √ 2t log log t. The reason for this is that we are interested in bounding an expert's expectation as a function of the time horizon T . Proving that the LIL bound is exceeded (or not) does not serve to establish a bound on the expert's expectation at T , since the benefit is a function of t, and not of T . On the other hand, assigning a probability that a deviation of Φ(t) is exceeded is equivalent to assigning a probability that the expert's reward exceeds Φ 2 (t)/t = 2 log log T , a function of T .
Our bound Φ(t) is higher than the LIL's bound of √ 2t log log t, as T ≥ t. Exceeding it does not contradict the LIL, first, since it might exceed only once and not infinitely often, and second, since it is not claimed that for any time t in which it holds we have log log T / log log t > 1 + with probability 1 for some fixed > 0.
The following proposition places upper and lower bounds on the expectation of the optimal policy for a time horizon T , i.e., Ψ(T ). 
To get a better understanding of the magnitude of the γs note that for ∈ [0, 1] γ 1 (T, ) < 12 log(1 + 2 /4)
and for < 0.2 and log log T > 16/ 2 we have
and in fact we can make the exponent /16 much closer to /4.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 will be done in two parts. First, for the upper bound, in Lemma 5.2. Second, for the lower bound, in Lemma 5.4. We start with the upper bound.
LEMMA 5.2. For every > 0 and T > 10,
where γ 1 (T, ) := 12
Here is an overview of the proof, which is found in the full version [Ban et al. 2016 ]: Instead of bounding Ψ(T ), we bound a larger quantity, the expected value of M T , defined as the maximum of S 2 t /t for t ≤ T . For this we need to bound the probability that M T > (1 + )2 log log T , and the expectation of M T will follow by integrating this probability over . Therefore our probability bound must also be tight enough to assure that this integral does not diverge.
We partition the time [1, T ] to a logarithmic number of gaps, with endpoints a k where a = 1 + Θ( 2 ). This implies that we have log a (T ) = Θ( −2 log T ) such endpoints. We show that with high probability, for any endpoint a k the probability that the deviation is more than 2a k log log T times 1 + Θ( ) is significantly less than 1/(log a T ). Since there are log a T such endpoints, a union bound makes it hold for all endpoints by a probability close to 1. The next step is to bound the deviation within the gaps (a k , a k+1 ]. For this we use an inequality attributed to Levy which relates the probability of a deviation of each single time to the probability of deviation of the maximum over all the time points. Our bound for Pr[M T > (1 + )2 log log T ] is a union bound of the endpoints bound and the gaps bound. This gives us a high probability bound for M T . To complete the proof, we integrate over the failure probabilities to get an upper bound on the expectation of M T .
We establish a lower bound of for Ψ(T ) by first lower bounding M T .
LEMMA 5.3. For every 0 < < 1/2 and every T > 16
The proof of this lemma is in the full version [Ban et al. 2016] . Here is an overview of it: We show that with high probability M T is large enough. This will establish a lower bound for a simple, non-optimal policy and therefore also a lower bound for Ψ(T ).
As in the upper bound, to bound M T we again partition the time [1, T ] to a logarithmic number of gaps, with endpoints a k where a > 1. (Unlike the case of the upper bound, where a = 1 + Θ( ), for the lower bound we use a = Θ( −2 ), and hence there are huge gaps between a k and a k+1 .) We lower-bound the deviation within each gap, and, using the independence of the gaps establish that with probability close to 1 one of the gaps (a k , a k+1 ] will have a large enough relative deviation. We also show that, with high probability, no endpoint S a k is "too negative". Combining the large deviation within the gap and its not-too-negative value at its start leads to our desired bound.
We can now complete the lower bound proof for Ψ(T ).
LEMMA 5.4. For every 1/2 > > 0 and T > 16,
PROOF. Lemma 5.3 suggests the following stopping strategy: Choose 0 < < 1/2, and use a stopping strategy of S 2 t /t > (1 − )2 log log T . The expected reward from this is at least (1 − γ 2 (T, ))(1 − )2 log log T . The optimal strategy has at least the expected reward of any strategy, therefore
for every 0 < < 1/2. The proof of the corollary is in the full verison [Ban et al. 2016 ]. The corollary implies that
but in fact provides a much more refined convergence bound, showing that the loworder term is of the order of only log log log T . From Proposition 5.1 and (14), and observing that ψ t (·) is minimized at zero, using Corollary 5.5, we derive the following upper bound on the threshold. COROLLARY 5.6. For log log T ≥ 35, θ(t) ≤ t ψ t (0) ≤ t 2 log log T + 8 log log log T + 6 ≤ t 3 log log T However, the bound given above is far from tight. We conjecture that, θ(t) = Θ( t log log t) .
(18) 6. COMPUTING AN APPROXIMATE OPTIMAL POLICY
Algorithm and Error Bound
We show how to approximate optimal policy by an efficient algorithm, based on the recurrence formula (6). Our algorithm (Figure 1 ) receives a parameter γ > 0 which controls its accuracy. The algorithm iteratively uses the rectangle method, with given rectangle width γ, for approximating the integral in (8). Namely it approximates
Values of ψ t−1 in this expression are taken from values computed in the previous iteration.
First, we bound the error in approximating the integral by truncating the tails. (See the full version [Ban et al. 2016 ] for proof.) LEMMA 6.1. For ∈ (0, 1), h ≥ 6 log(2T / ), and = −h, we have Fig. 1 . Algorithm to compute optimal policy PROOF. By Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 we have,
We now show the proof by induction on t. Clearly it holds for t = 1. For the inductive step for t − 1 we have |ψ * t−1 (iγ) − ψ t−1 (iγ)| ≤ (t − 1)/T . We now compute ψ * t based on ψ * t−1 and have
where we used the fact that 1 √ 2π /γ<i<h/γ e − x 2 i 2 ≤ 1.
We now bound the running time of our algorithm. As a supplementary step to the algorithm, the expert's expected optimal reward Ψ(T ) may be calculated from its definition in Definition 3.2, using numeric integration (e.g., with the rectangle method), without significant addition to error or running time.
Assuming that our conjectured bounds, as given in (18) and Appendix D of [Ban et al. 2016] , hold, the algorithm is significantly faster: The integration rectangle width γ can be widened by a factor of O( √ T ), for a gain of O(T ) in running time. Due to the lower bound on θ(t), the number of rectangles is reduced by a further factor of O( √ T ) for an overall O(T 1.5 ) improvement, and an algorithm completing inÕ(T 2.5 / ) steps
Empirical Simulation
We have derived the exact bound using an empirical method, and the results show that indeed our theoretical bounds are very close to the correct bounds.
The result of such a calculation, for up to T = 10, 000, 000 (ln ln T 2.78), is shown in Figure 2 , where the expected reward is plotted against the time horizon (on a log-log scale). The figure has the optimal prediction threshold (shown in the form θ 2 (t)/t, i.e., the benefit of predicting with |S t | = θ(t)), the expert's expectation with S t = 0, i.e., ψ t (0), and the reference 2 log log t.
In Figure 3 the canonical expectation profile at t = 10, 000, 000 is shown for all values S t = c up to c < θ(t) 8, 000. For t ≥ θ(t), the expectation equals c 2 /t, which is plotted in reference. 
Conclusions
We analyzed the expert's policy in the prediction scenario described, and found that the expert's optimal strategy is to adopt a policy that aims to maximize the value of (y t − x t ) 2 /t. To do so the expert adopts a prediction threshold based on his deviation from the market value |y t − x t | ≥ √ qθ(t) where q is his quality, and θ is a slowly increasing function of the time left t. His expected benefit from this optimal policy includes a positive term that depends on q only, and a time-varying, slowly increasing term which is proportional to q and a function ψ t (c) of the time left t and his current deviation from the market c. The expert's expected optimal reward Ψ(T ) is roughly 2 log log T , with bounds on the deviations.
